The history of cryptography standards is reviewed, with a view to planning for the challenges, uncertainties, and strategies that the standardization of postquantum cryptography will entail. O n 15 December 2016, NIST announced a call for proposals for quantum-resistant public-key cryptographic algorithms. 1 The call, whose deadline is 30 November 2017, covers all public-key cryptographic primitives currently standardized by NIST: public-key encryption, key agreement, and digital signature schemes.
difficulty of factoring large composite integers, PQC schemes are based on problems that are predicted to remain hard even with quantum computers, such as solving the shortest vector problem (SVP) in a lattice, solving systems of multivariate quadratic equations over finite fields (MQ) , and decoding problems in an error-correcting code.
In August 2015, NSA announced its plan to transition to quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms in the not-too-distant future. Standardizing PQC schemes is the first step in this transition. Considering the nearly three decades of experience applying public-key crypto graphy and today's mature deployment environment, will plugging PQC into existing applications be as easy as replacing a light bulb? In this article, I discuss the challenges and opportunities involved in developing and deploying PQC standards.
History Doesn't Always Repeat Itself
When public-key cryptography was invented in the 1970s, people were fascinated by its use of number theory and finite fields to resolve key distribution problems. For thousands of years, enabling encryption had demanded a secret channel to distribute keys. Public-key cryptography allows communicating parties to establish a shared secret key without a secret channel.
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It also enables digital signatures for public authentication and authorization.
As the 1990s began, revolutionary advances in computing technology and digital communications provided commercial opportunities for public-key cryptography deployment. RSA Laboratories developed and published the first de facto standards: the Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) series. 5 In particular, PKCS#1 provides the basic definitions of and recommendations for implementing RSA public-key cryptosystems. In 1994, IEEE approved the P1363 project to develop a public-key cryptography standard. Around the same time, X9, a standards organization for financial services, established working group X9F1 to develop public-key cryptography standards. The standards developed by IEEE P1363 and X9F1 focus on general-use algorithm specifications. The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) was probably the first organization to standardize public-key cryptography for real applications, that is, Internet protocols. Internet Key Exchange (IKE) 6 and TLS 7 are two protocols in which public-key cryptography is used for mutual authentication and key establishment.
In standardization's early days, the goal was to make use of public-key cryptography in the emerging network for communication and commerce. Security notions and proofs weren't as well developed as they are today. The ideas underlying the RSA and Diffie-Hellman schemes can be explained to people with a high school mathematics background. The relationship between the hardness of integer factorization and RSA, and between the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) and Diffie-Hellman, are intuitive enough to be widely understood.
Early research focused on the computing complexity of factorization and discrete logarithm computation. Theory focused on reduction proofs and the existence of (trapdoor) one-way functions, pseudorandom functions, and so on.
At that time, many details about securely implementing public-key cryptography weren't understood. For example, PKCS#1's padding scheme has several versions, with some of the padding methods having security flaws. That is, the hardness of factorization can't guarantee the security of the RSA scheme in practice unless every detail is handled properly. RSA Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (RSA-OAEP) was proposed as a provably secure method for RSA encryption at the 1994 Workshop on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques. 8 RSA-OAEP introduced not only a new way to randomize plaintext messages to hide every bit of the plaintext but also the concept of nonmalleable security against adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks (NM-CCA2, also known as IND-CCA2) under the random oracle model.
In the past two decades, more security notions have been established and used to prove security for a given cryptosystem. The rich theory in the provable security provides confidence in new cryptography systems. However, determining how much to weigh provable security when selecting algorithms for standardization remains a challenge. For a given cryptographic scheme, should we adopt a provably secure but less efficient version -or the version that seems secure but doesn't have a security proof? As security theories advance, this decision might become harder.
We must also remember that efficiency in any particular computing environment has historically been a critical factor for adoption. In other words, a small advantage in performance might differentiate one algorithm from another. For example, being able to select small public-key sizes to speed up encryption and signature verification for RSA algorithms was considered a remarkable advantage. In the 1990s, great effort was made to improve performance. Open source implementations weren't available.
On the other hand, attackers were also limited by computing capacity. For IKE, Oakley Group 1 used a prime modulus of less than 800 bits in the Diffie-Hellman key agreement, which is very weak considering today's discrete logarithm algorithms and computing power. Equally small integers were also used for RSA as moduli.
Today, computing power has increased tremendously. Although efficiency remains important, for many of today's implementation platforms, resource demands for implementing cryptography aren't major showstoppers. Furthermore, recently proposed PQC algorithms-such as lattice-based, coding-based, and multivariate cryptosystems-appear efficient enough to be plugged in to environments in which public-key cryptography is now implemented. Therefore, processing efficiency might not be the major competing factor differentiating algorithms. But for very constrained devices and bandwidth-limited networks, key size, signature size, and ciphertext expansion might become barriers for applications.
Will plugging postquantum cryptography (PQC) into existing applications be as easy as replacing a light bulb? Uncertainties
It's taken a quarter of a century for us, as a community, to understand the currently deployed public-key crypto graphic systems. On the journey to deploying them, we've learned to avoid security pitfalls step by step. We know there's no easy path, and NIST's announcement to commence standardization of PQC has highlighted several uncertainties. The first uncertainty is whether now is the time to standardize new cryptographic schemes. We've not yet seen quantum computers that can crack RSA and Diffie-Hellman cryptographic schemes. Although promising progress has been made on quantum computers, we can't estimate a time frame for their development with any certainty. If quantum computers don't appear along a predictable timeline, when should we make up our minds to move toward quantum-resistant cryptosystems?
The second uncertainty concerns classical security for newly emerging PQC algorithms. In addition to the cost of replacing deployed cryptosystems with new schemes, are there risks involved in deploying such new cryptographic systems? Indeed, many proposed schemes have been broken in the past decade due to classical security flaws. Considering how long it's taken us to understand the security of the cryptosystems currently in use, it seems risky to move quickly to any of the new schemes.
The third uncertainty is probably the most worrisome. We know much less about the properties of quantum computers than classical computers. Could new quantum algorithms be discovered that lead to attacks on algorithms thought to be resistant to quantum attacks? Likewise, the performance characteristics of future quantum computers-cost, speed, memory size, and so on-are not well understood. This uncertainty has resulted in differing opinions regarding the appropriate quantum security strength levels for setting parameters and key sizes.
Shakespeare's plays often focus on the impossibility of certainty. Doesn't this also seem to be the case for cryptography's history? We believed factorization and discrete logarithm were hard, until quantum computers and quantum algorithms emerged to shake our beliefs. As we move toward PQC standardization, the first step will be to understand and work with the uncertainties.
There's much uncertainty about when quantum computers will be available at scale. What's certain is that developing and deploying new cryptographic standards will take years. Considering that some data protection requirements will remain confidential for many years, we must ensure that quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms are in place ahead of time to guarantee backward secrecy. If, as the experts predict, there's "a one-in-seven chance that some fundamental public-key crypto will be broken by quantum by 2026, and a one-in-two chance of the same by 2031," 9 then we don't have much time to complete the standardization and deployment process. For cryptography, a one-inseven chance to be broken is indeed non-negligible. Taking cautious action to start the process is the only option for dealing with the uncertainty.
Classical security certainly will be the first consideration for quantum-resistant cryptosystems. Whereas some possible candidates are fairly new, others were proposed years ago and have been shown to be secure. For example, the code-based McEliece encryption algorithm was proposed in the 1970s, 10 while NTRUencrypt was proposed in the 1990s. 11 Uncertainty about classical security arises for the newer versions of these algorithms that improve performance or key sizes. The fact that some new schemes have been broken quickly actually proves that our community's cryptanalysis abilities regarding classical security have grown strong, so we'll likely be able to identify security flaws effectively. Furthermore, an open, transparent process will allow cryptographers and the community to thoroughly analyze and assess the security of newly proposed algorithms.
Indeed, our understanding of quantum security is far less comprehensive than our understanding of classical security. However, over the past few years, we've made significant progress. The standardization process will certainly promote research on quantum algorithms and quantum security. As further progress is made in quantum computing, we'll learn more about quantum security.
In dealing with these uncertainties, NIST proposes to use five equivalent security classes to select parameters and keys for each proposed algorithm. 12 The general assumption is that there are no known quantum attacks on the proposed scheme (for example, Shor's attack on factorization), with the exception of generic quantum speedup (for example, Grover's quadratic speedup on Advanced Encryption Standard [AES] key search). The five security classes reflect not only classical security strength but also the effectiveness of quantum speedups at the same classical security level. For example, if a scheme can provide 128-bit classical security and there's no quantum attack other than classical attacks with generic quantum speedups, such as Grover's, then the scheme should be able to provide 64-bit quantum security. However, if quantum speedups aren't as effective as Grover's key search on AES-128, then the scheme should be able to provide a quantum security level greater than 64 bits. Note that breaking 64-bit quantum security could be significantly more difficult and expensive than breaking 64-bit classical security. Precisely estimating the quantum security of PQC algorithms will require extensive collaboration between classical and quantum researchers.
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Nevertheless, all of these uncertainties urge us to start, because they'll take time to understand and resolve. It's going to be a long journey.
Postquantum Cryptography Drop-In Replacements
Today, public-key cryptography is used everywhere. Introducing quantum-resistant counterparts involves a transition stage. Finding PQC algorithms that can be used as drop-in replacements will make the transition less disruptive. The question is, can we find them?
As I discussed, processing complexity might not be a barrier anymore, because most emerging PQC algorithms are pretty efficient in terms of processing time. However, we must prepare to deal with new challenges. One example is stateful hash-based signatures. 13 Hash-based signatures were first introduced in the 1970s in the Lamport one-time signature scheme. A major disadvantage of Lamport one-time signatures is their large public and private keys. To sign a message M, h(M) = {0, 1} k , 2k hash values have to be saved. In 1979, Ralph Merkle proposed using a hash tree to reduce the public-key size. 14 Stateful hash-based signatures are essentially Merkle signatures. Compared to other PQC categories, the security of hash-based signatures is better understood. However, each private key can be used only once. Thus, the task of managing private keys, also called state management, becomes a major challenge for large-scale applications of hash-based signatures.
To overcome this state management challenge, stateless hash-based signatures were introduced. 15 However, these have a much larger signature size. For bandwidth-limited applications, signature transmission might require segmenting the data into multiple messages in the existing protocols. Some postquantum signature schemes, such as the family of schemes based on multivariate cryptography (for example, Quartz, 16 Rainbow, 17 and their variants), offer signature sizes compatible with standardized signature schemes such as the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA). But the public-and private-key sizes can be hundreds of times larger. As a result, a given quantum-resistant signature scheme could work as a replacement in one application but not in another-there's no one-for-all drop-in replacement.
The Diffie-Hellman key agreement is a beautiful public-key cryptography scheme for many reasons. When ephemeral keys are used, it provides perfect forward secrecy-meaning the compromise of long-term keys doesn't compromise past session keys. This has become a very desirable property. As specified by IETF, in TLS version 1.2 and earlier versions, three key establishment schemes have been supported: RSA key transport, Static and Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman, and Ephemeral-Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman. In the newest version, TLS 1.3, Ephemeral-Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman is the only supported key establishment scheme.
A Diffie-Hellman quantum-resistant counterpart tops the wish list, and researchers are pursuing this direction. Oded Regev's learning with errors (LWE) problem has turned out to be a promising basis for constructing Diffie-Hellman-like key agreement schemes. 18 Jintai Ding and his colleagues built the first such scheme in 2012. 19 Currently, more than one Diffie-Hellman-like quantum-resistant key establishment scheme has been proposed and even prototyped. Although their properties differ, they're generally very close to the Diffie-Hellman key agreement.
One of these schemes is named New Hope. 20 And the proposed scheme is indeed as the name claims: a new hope for a drop-in Diffie-Hellman replacement. Performance is quite reasonable. The difference is that the operations aren't symmetric for the two parties. Not only do the operations differ, but the responder needs to generate a message based on the initiator's public value. The scheme could possibly fail even if both parties correctly select random values and conduct operations. This might not be a major concern for key establishment, but it can hardly be considered a drop-in replacement for Diffie-Hellman.
Another "new hope" for key agreement is a family of recently proposed schemes based on isogenies between elliptic curves. The hardness of finding isogenies between supersingular elliptic curves was first introduced as the basis for cryptosystems more than 10 years ago by Denis Charles and his colleagues. 21 One version is called Super singular Isogeny Diffie-Hellman (SIDH) to emphasize the resemblance to Diffie-Hellman key agreement. Operationally, it's more symmetric for the two parties. For those looking for drop-in replacements, SIDH looks much closer to Diffie-Hellman key agreement than other postquantum key agreement schemes. Performance-wise, it's significantly slower and more costly than Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH). 22 However, if performance cost is an issue for some As we move toward PQC standardization, the first step will be to understand and work with the uncertainties.
applications or processors, then SIDH might not be a suitable replacement for Diffie-Hellman key agreement. Furthermore, whether a new PQC standard can be used as a drop-in replacement might depend on not only similarities in the key size, signature size, and format but also on whether the security implementation technologies we developed in the past can ensure PQC security. Protocols and applications that introduce new mechanisms might be required to guarantee secure implementation of the new schemes. That is, the existing protocols or applications might not provide sufficient countermeasures to deal with new issues.
Secure Implementation Issues for New Algorithms
While developing and deploying the first generation of public-key cryptography standards, we learned a lot about dealing with secure implementation issues. The experience we gained will help prepare us mentally to face the issues of PQC. But we'll need new techniques, examples of which I discuss here.
Public-Key Validation
In discrete logarithm-based cryptosystems such as Diffie-Hellman key agreement, public-key validation is needed to ensure that the public key is in the right subgroup, because a small subgroup attack can force the established secret value into a small group that's vulnerable to exhaustive search. However, public-key validation is not straightforward for all the new PQC algorithms. Some methods have been introduced to conduct indirect public-key validation. Some alternative indirect validation methods might have to require one party to reveal a function value of its secret key and jeopardize the security. Other suggested methods might be very costly and impractical.
Public-Key Reuse
In a Diffie-Hellman key agreement scheme, a public key can be ephemeral or static. Even for ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key agreement, some existing protocols allow the ephemeral key to be used in more than one execution. However, for some quantum-resistant key agreement schemes, if a public key is reused, it becomes compromised. The reuse might be intentional-by an attacker-or careless-by a legitimate party using a bad key generation function. If key agreement with such a protocol is deployed, it must include mechanisms to prevent or reduce the security risk brought about by reusing public keys.
Decryption Failure
In a public-key encryption scheme such as RSA, if the involved parties follow the rules to select keys and parameters and conduct the operations properly, then the plaintext will be obtained through the decryption operation. Similarly, in a Diffie-Hellman key agreement scheme, if each party executes as specified, they'll obtain the same secret value in the end. However, in some of the newly emerging public-key encryption schemes, decryption or key agreement isn't always correct. That is, even if every parameter and key is selected per the specification and each operation is executed properly, it's still possible that the plaintext won't be obtained through a decryption or that the two parties won't share the same secret value after executing the scheme. Such decryption failure happens with a relatively small probability but might introduce security flaws.
Auxiliary Functions
Public-key cryptography schemes usually entail using certain auxiliary functions. For instance, hash functions are used as an auxiliary function for digital signatures. Some PQC schemes will need new auxiliary functions for secure implementation.
In the past, we've depended on the notion that a value can be selected uniformly at random from a properly sized set. A robust and secure random number generator is critical for the secure implementation of many cryptosystems in use today. We've concentrated on ensuring correct implementations of random number generators to output uniformly distributed elements in a given set. Now, some of the new PQC algorithms require certain values to be selected according to a specific nonuniform distribution. For example, in R-LWE-based schemes like New Hope, the "error" value must be selected according to a Gaussian distribution. Simulating these required distributions requires the introduction of new auxiliary functions. Because the implementation's security relies on properly selected values with the required distribution, the simulation function is critical.
Some of the security implementation issues raised by PQC might not be new. For example, countermeasures for side-channel attacks have been implemented for the cryptosystems currently in use. But we might need new methods and techniques to protect a given new algorithm from side-channel attacks. Also, implementing the countermeasures to deal with security issues might increase processing and communicating complexity for a given scheme. Therefore, understanding the tradeoffs is critical to making the right decisions.
The Road Ahead
For PQC standardization, we might not get what we wish for. Nevertheless, we have reasons to be optimistic about the road ahead.
First, cryptographic research has advanced tremendously in the past 25 years. The security notions and POSTQUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY, PART 1 proofs that have been developed will certainly help us better understand the security of new schemes. The research community has already demonstrated a strong ability to conduct effective cryptanalysis on schemes to be deployed.
Second, the applications community has matured. Public-key cryptography has been implemented in many communication protocols and digital devices. The applications community has gained extensive experience deploying new cryptographic algorithms.
Furthermore, open source implementations are available for most of the cryptographic algorithms in use. These open source implementations have promoted a collective effort to ensure best practice.
Finally, advanced computing and communication technologies can accommodate cryptographic functions that are more demanding of processing and communication resources.
To overcome the fact that no exact drop-in replacements have been proposed for currently deployed cryptosystems, future standards could specify multiple algorithms for each cryptographic primitive according to the requirements of different applications, especially to deal with nonideal characteristics such as large signature size or large keys. These algorithms could be selected from different categories and based on different hard problems. The reason for doing so is that signature or key size might not be a problem for some applications but a showstopper for others. In this way, the standards could allow different applications to deploy different algorithms. On the other hand, existing protocols might need to be modified to handle larger signatures or key size, for example, through segmentation of messages. For new applications, implementations must keep the demands of PQC in mind and allow the new schemes to adapt to them. PQC requirements might shape future application standards.
Secure implementation issues can be addressed through different approaches. For instance, efforts have been made to reduce the probability of decryption failure on schemes like NTRUencrypt by justifying parameters and keys. Mechanisms could also be added at the protocol level to limit security flaws.
F
or PQC standardization, we will need a new wineskin to hold the new wine. Plugging quantum-resistant cryptosystems into existing applications will be a new experience for both cryptographers and practitioners. But the valuable experience we've accumulated in the past 25 years of working on first-generation public-key cryptography standards will help us deal with the new issues and challenges.
